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A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF STATES' RECOGNITION
OF REDUCED DEGREES OF FELONY MURDER
At common law, the felony murder rule defined any homicide com-
mitted during the perpetration of a felony as murder.1 English courts
criticized the harsh penal consequences of the rule2 and in 1957, Parlia-
ment abolished the rule.' The majority of jurisdictions in the United States,
I See Lord Dacre's Case, 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROxvN 439 (1546) (killing during
attempted felony is murder); Regina v. Keat, 87 Eng. Rep. 661, 662 (1697) (dictum) (any
killing during commission of felony is murder). Historically, authorities have disagreed con-
cerning the type of underlying act sufficient to support a felony murder conviction. Com-
pare E. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 56 (1680) (unlawful act not necessarily a felony may sup-
port felony murder conviction) with 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 465 (1778) (felony
murder results only when underlying act is a felony) and 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
192-93 (1809) (homicide resulting from commission of felony is murder, but killing as conse-
quence of civil trespass is manslaughter).
I See Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox, CRIM. CAS. 311, 312-3 (1887). In Seine, the court criti-
cized the felony murder rule as being cruel and inadequately supported by authority. Id.
The court rejected the doctrine that any felony may serve as an adequate basis for a felony
murder conviction. Id. The Serne court adopted the limitation that any act known to be
dangerous to life and likely to cause death, that is committed with the purpose of perpetrating
a felony, and which causes death, is murder. Id. at 313. Other courts, recognizing the harsh
penal consequences of the rule, found ways to completely avoid application of the rule. See
Regina v. Greenwood, 7 Cox, CRIr. CAS. 404 (1857); Regina v. Horsey, 176 Eng. Rep. 129
(1862). In Greenwood, the jury found the defendant quilty of rape but would not convict
the defendant of the felony murder because of the severe penal consequences. 7 Cox, CRIM.
CAS. at 404. In Horsey, the jury convicted the defendant of arson but not of felony murder.
176 Eng. Rep. at 130. Although the defendant in Horsey had set fire to an enclosure that
resulted in the occupant's death, the jury decided that the deceased had entered the enclosure
after the fire had started and therefore, the deceased's death was not the natural conse-
quence of the defendant's unlawful act. Id. at 131-32.
Other English courts only applied the felony murder rule in limited instances. See Director
of Public Prosecution v. Beard, 1920 A.C. 479, 481 (liability determined by objective test
of whether killing was act of violence and commited in furtherance of violent felony); Regina
v. Whitmarsh, 62 J.P. 711 (1898) (when underlying act is nonviolent felony, such as abortion,
liability hinges on whether reasonable man could have seen no possibility of death).
I See HOMICIDE ACT, 5 & 6 Eliz. II, c. 11 (1957) (abolition of felony murder rule in
England).
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however, retain various attentuated forms of the rule.4 In response to
arguments against strict application of the rule to a higher degree of
murder, such as first degree murder,' several jurisdictions now apply the
rule to reduced degrees of homicide, such as second or third degree
murder,6 or involuntary manslaughter.7 Only a minority of jurisdictions,
however, limit the application of the rule with the principles of malice
See chart below (referencing footnotes and accompanying text discussing individual





















































*statutes define only first degree felony murder
**statutes define first, second and/or third degree felony murder
***statutes define felony murder and felony involuntary manslaughter
I See R. MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 53-54 (1952) (felony murder rule should be
limited to prove reduced degrees of homicide). See generally People v. Aaron, 409 Mich.
672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980) (discussion of various courts' criticism of felony murder rule).
' See infra notes 30 & 33 (list of statutes recognizing reduced degrees of felony
homicide). A minority of states recognize third degree felony murder as a type of murder
imposing a less severe punishment than second degree murder. See FLA. STAT. ANN. S 782.04
(Supp. 1982) (statutory recognition of third degree felony murder); MINN. STAT. ANN.
5 609.195 (West Supp. 1982) (third degree felony murder statutorily defined).
I See infra note 34 (discussion of statutes recognizing types of involuntary
manslaughter).
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aforethought8 and criminal liability9 that formed the basis of the original
common-law felony murder rule."0
English courts first applied the felony murder rule in 1536,11 eleven
years prior to the last statutory enactment dividing homicide into the
categories of murder and criminal homicide. 2 The 1547 homicide statute
defined murder as any killing committed with "malice aforethought."'3
Criminal homicide, later defined as manslaughter, included killings com-
mitted without malice aforethought." Prior to the late seventeenth cen-
tury, malice aforethought designated a general malevolence or a volun-
' See infra note 30 (list of statutes limiting felony murder rule to reduced degrees
of unlawful-act homicide); see also infra, text accompanying notes 109-112 (discussion of prin-
ciples of malice aforethought that underlay common-law felony murder rule). Several state
courts have imposed numerous limitations on the rule in an attempt to reconcile the rule
with current malice aforethought requirements. See People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 680,
299 N.W.2d 304, 312-13 (1980). Numerous jurisdictions require that the underlying felony
be dangerous to human life and that the homicide be the natural and probable consequence
of the act. Id. at 312-13 & nn.47-48. Other jurisdictions require that the felon caused the
death "in furtherance" of a felonious purpose and that the victim was not one of the felons.
Id. at 313 & n.50. Several jurisdictions apply other limitations to further restrict applica-
tion of the rule. See generally Note, The Felony-Murder Rule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine,
23 CATH. LAW. 133 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Viable Doctrine] (discussion of statutory
limitations of rule).
See infra text accompanying notes 101-103 (discussion of inconsistencies between
majority of felony murder statutes and principles of criminal liability).
"o See infra text accompanying notes 11-22 (development of felony murder rule at com-
mon law).
11 See Mansell and Herbert's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 279, 280 (K.B. 1536) (court convicted
group of men of murder when one man, during an attempted theft, accidentally struck and
killed a woman with a stone thrown at another person).
" See 1 Edw. 6, c. 12, 510 (1547) (statute dividing homicide into two categories by remov-
ing benefit of the clergy from more culpable offense of murder). Prior to the sixteenth cen-
tury, the benefit of the clergy attached to all felonies that were capital offenses. See L.
GABEL, BENEFIT OF THE CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES, 116 (1929). The
benefit of the clergy allowed any literate defendant to face prosecution under the Church's
jurisdiction, rather than the Crown's jurisdiction. Id. at 7. Ecclesiastical courts were more
lenient and provided absolute immunity from capital punishment. Id. at 117-18. Courts used
a literacy test to distinguish between clerics, who could invoke the benefit of the clergy,
and illiterate lay persons. Id. at 30. By the early sixteenth century, however, mental culpability
replaced "literacy" as the factor that determined punishment for murder. See Note, Felony
Murder as a First Degree Offense: An Anachronism Retained, 66 YALE L. J. 427, 428-29 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Anachronism] (historical overview of benefit of the clergy).
'" See 1 Edw. 6, c. 12, s. 10 (1547) (statute eliminating benefit of the clergy from all
murders committed with malice prepensed, later designated as malice aforethought); 3 J.
STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 44 (1883) (murder included homicides
committed with malice aforethought). The Statute of 13 Richard, passed in 1389 to regulate
pardons, contained the first statutory recognition of malice prepensed later designated as
malice aforethought. 13 Rich. 2, no. 2, c. 1 (1389); 3 STEPHEN at 43. Courts, prior to the
seventeenth century, defined the term "malice aforethought" as a general desire to injure. Id,
" See 3 STEPHEN, supra note 13, at 44 (criminal homicide later called manslaughter,
included killings committed without malice aforethought).
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tary wrongdoing."5 Although a minority of courts retained the original
definition of malice aforethought," other seventeenth century courts began
to insert the mental requisites of premeditation and specific intent into
malice aforethought." In an attempt to reconcile the felony murder rule
with the indefinite malice aforethought requirement for murder, courts
adopted the theory of constructive malice. 8 The theory of constructive
malice permitted courts to substitute the felon's intent to commit the
underlying felony for the malice aforethought requirement of murder.'9
Originally, the felony murder rule encompassed all felonies" and the
punishment for felony murder was death." The punishment for the com-
mission of a felony, however, also frequently was death.2
In 1681, Pennsylvania became the first jurisdiction in the United States
to adopt English felony laws, including the definition of murder as any
killing committed with malice aforethought.' In 1682 and 1683, the gover-
nor of Pennsylvania amended the laws by providing that only murder war-
ranted the death penalty and by substituting "wilfully and premeditate-
"' See Halloway's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 715, 716 (1625) (cruel act against victim who of-
fers no resistance provides evidence of malice prepensed); Grey's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1084,
1085 (1666) (voluntary commission of wrongful act is evidence of malice prepensed); Regina
v. Mawgridge, 84 Eng. Rep. 1107, 1111 (1669) (individual who voluntarily committed cruel
act behaved with malice prepensed); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 469 n.1 (1911) (prior to late seventeenth century malice
aforethought designated voluntary wrongdoing).
18 See Regina v. Doherty, 16 Cox, CRIM. CAS. 306, 307 (1887) (Stephen, J.) (acting with
malice aforethought means committing cruel act voluntarily).
" See infra text accompanying note 109 (discussion of courts' differing interpretations
of malice aforethought during seventeenth century).
18 See Mackalay's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 239, 240 (1611) (court substituted felon's mental
state accompanying commission of felony for malice aforethought requirement of murder).
Theory of "constructive malice" substitutes the intent to commit a felony for the requisite
malice aforethought element of murder. See Viable Doctrine, supra note 8, at 135 n.3 (1977).
Courts frequently used constructive malice interchangeably with "implied malice." See T.
MORRIS & L. BLOM COOPER, A CALENDAR OF MURDER: CRIMINAL HOMICIDE IN ENGLAND SINCE
1957, 313 (1964). The theory of implied malice allows courts to infer malice aforethought
from the defendant's intention to cause serious bodily harm or to commit an act likely to
cause death. See Viable Doctrine, supra note 8, at 135 n.3.
" See Regina v. Woodburne & Coke, 16 State Tr. 53 (1722) (King, C.J.) (felonious intent
accompanying commission of unlawful act imputed to accidental killing, converting acciden-
tal killing into murder).
See supra note 1 (felony murder rule originally applied to killing committed during
perpetration of any felony).
'1 See 3 STEPHEN, supra note 13, at 44-46 (punishment for unjustifiable or unexcusable
murder was death).
' See Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York, 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 43, 53-54 (1937) (ma-
jority of common-law felonies were punishable by death).
I See CHARTER TO WILLIAM PENN AND LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA PASSED
BETWEEN YEARS OF 1682 & 1700, 84 (1874) (felony laws of England applied to Pennsylvania).
When Pennsylvania adopted English felony law, murder at common law included any kill-
ing of a human with malice aforethought. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 425 (1736).
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ly" for the malice aforethought element of common-law murder.' In 1794
the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute defining first degree
murder' as any deliberate, wilful, and premeditated killing or any killing
committed during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of arson,
rape, robbery, or burglary. ' Courts, however, ignored the requirement
of wilful premeditation and considered intent to kill sufficient to support
a first degree murder convictionY In 1974, the Pennsylvania legislature
eliminated the element of premeditation from the first degree murder
statute and reduced felony murder to second degree murder.28
Currently, all but three states in the United States recognize some
form of felony murder. 9 Unlike Pennsylvania, however, the majority of
states do not restrict felony murder to a reduced degree of homicide, such
as second or third degree murder or involuntary manslaughter.0 The
U See 2 STAT. AT LARGE OF PENN. 1700-1712 at 172 (1896) (establishment of reduced
penalty for all offenses except murder, which required proof of willful premeditation under
amended murder statute).
2 See 4 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 80 (Pa. 1794) (statutory division of murder into first
and second degree).
26 See id.
I See Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55, 56 (1862) (true criterion of first degree
murder is intent); Respublica v. Mulatto Bob, 4 Dall., 145, 146 (Pa. 1795) (intention, rather
than premeditation, remains true criterion of liability for first degree murder).
I Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 2502 (Purdon 1983) (1974 amendment reduced
first degree felony murder to second degree felony murder) with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2502 (Purdon 1973) (first degree felony murder encompasses killings committed during
perpetration of specific felonies).
" See infra notes 30-34 (list of felony murder statutes for various jurisdictions).
" See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 2502 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (statutory limitation of
felony murder to murder in second degree); see also infra notes 33-34 (list of statutes apply-
ing felony murder rule to multiple degrees of homicide). Of the jurisdictions that recognize
multiple degrees of murder, only six jurisdictions restrict application of the felony murder
rule to one reduced degree of murder. See ALASKA STAT. S 11.41.110 (Supp. 1982) (recogniz-
ing only second degree, not first degree, felony murder); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A
§ 202 (1964 & Supp. 1982) (felony murder is lesser offense than nonfelony murder); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975) (statutory recognition of only second degree felony
murder); OHio REV. CODE ANN. S 2903.04 (Baldwin 1983) (statute restricts rule to felony
involuntary manslaughter); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 2502 (Purdon Supp. 1982) (first degree
felony murder reduced to second degree felony murder); Wis, STAT. ANN. S 940.02 (West
1982) (limiting felony murder rule to second degree murder). Statutes in several jurisdic-
tions that do not divide murder into degrees, include felony murder in the same category
as "murder" and do not statutorily recognize a lower degree of unlawful-act homicide. See
ALA. CODE S 13A-6-2 (1982 Repl. Vol.) (murder includes intentional killing or causing death
by reckless acts or acts evidencing extreme indifference towards human life or killing dur-
ing commission of enumerated felony); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. SS 53a-54a, 53a-54c (West
Supp. 1982) (murder includes intentional killing or killing during commission of enumerated
felony); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1 (1982) (murder includes killing with intent or abandoned
and malignant heart or killing during commission of any felony, MONT. CODE ANN. S 45-5-102
(1981) (murder includes any purposeful or knowing killing, or killing during commission of
enumerated or forcible felony); NJD. CENT. CODE S 12.1-16-01 (Supp. 1981) (murder includes
intentionally or knowingly causing death, or killing while acting with extreme indifference
16051983]
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jurisdictions that apply the rule to higher offenses, such as first degree
murder, generally convict individuals of felony murder on proof of a kill-
ing committed during the perpetration of a felony, without establishing
the mental state requirement for murder."' Several states have enacted
statutes that apply the felony murder rule to more than one degree of
homicide.2 Most states apply one form of the rule to a higher degree of
homicide and another form of the rule to a lower degree of homicide.'
towards human life, or while committing a particular felony); OR. REV. STAT. S 163.115 (1981)
(murder includes either intentional killing or killing during perpetration of a specific felony);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. S 19.02 (Vernon 1974) (murder includes intentionally or knowingly
causing death, or killing while committing a felony and during an act clearly dangerous
to human life).
"' See IDAHO CODE S 18-4003 (1979) (first degree felony murder conviction does not re-
quire proof of intent to kill); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (Supp. 1982) (killing without specific
intent to kill, while committing a felony, constitutes first degree murder); NED. REV. STAT.
§ 28-303 (1979) (intent to kill not necessary element of first degree murder conviction). But
see ARK. STAT. ANN. S 41-1501 (1977 RepI. Vol) (first degree felony murder requires proof
of extreme indifference to life and killing during commission of any felony).
12See ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. S 13-1105(A) (1978) (recognizing only first degree felony
murder); COLO. REV. STAT. S 18-3-102(b) (1978 Repl. Vol.) (statutes limit felony murder to
first degree offense). The Colorado Supreme Court has stated clearly that second degree
felony murder does not exist in Colorado. See Sayer v. People, 173 Colo. 351, 353, 478 P.2d
672, 674 (1970) (second degree felony murder not recognized). Iowa, Rhode Island, Vermont,
West Virginia and Wyoming also statutorily recognize only first degree felony murder as
a killing committed during the prepetration of an enumerated felony. See IOWA CODE ANN.
S 707.2 (West 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS S 11-23-1 (Supp. 1980); VT. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 513-2301
(1974); W. VA. CODE S 61-24 (1977 Repl. Vol.); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-101 (1977). Kansas'
first degree felony murder statute includes killings committed during perpetration of
nonenumerated felonies. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1981); see also infra note 33 (courts
judicially recognize second degree felony murder in absence of specific statutory provision).
I See CAL. PENAL CODE S 189 (West Supp. 1982) (statutes differentiate between first
and second degree felony murder); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, SS 11-635, 11-636 (1979 Repl.
Vol. & Supp. 1982) (statutory recognition of both first and second degree felony murder);
FLA. STAT. ANN. S 782.04 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982) (statutory delineation of first, second
and third degree felony murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:30, 14:30.1, 14:31 (West 1974
& Supp. 1982) (statutory recognition of first and second degree felony murder and form
of felony involuntary manslaughter); MINN. STAT. ANN. SS 609.185, 609.19 (West Supp. 1982)
(statutes differentiate between first and second degree felony murder); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 630:1-a, 630:1-b (Supp. 1981) (first and second degree felony murder recognized);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 5§ 701.7, 701.8 (West 1958 & Supp. 1982) (first and second degree
felony murder statutorily distinguished); S. DAK. CODIFIED LAWS, S 22-16-4, 22-16-9 (Supp.
1981) (first degree felony murder statutorily distinguished from second degree felony murder);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202, 76-5-203 (1978 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 1981) (first and second degree
felony murder recognized); VA. CODE § 18.2-32, 18.2-33 (1982 Repl. Vol.) (first degree felony
murder and reduced degree of felony homicide statutorily distinguished); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. 5§ 9A.32.030, 9A.32.050 (1977) (statutes established both first and second degree felony
murder). Some jurisdictions that do not recognize degrees of murder distinguish between
felony murder, as a form of murder, and felony involuntary manslaughter. See IND. STAT.
ANN. S§ 35-42-1-1, 35-42-1-4 (Burns 1979 Repl. Vol.) (felony murder and felony involuntary
manslaughter statutorily distinquished); see also infra note 34 (discussion of statutory distinc-
tions between felony murder and felony involuntary manslaughter).
In several jurisdictions that statutorily recognize only first degree felony murder, the
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The term "unlawful-act homicide" replaces the term "felony murder" to
encompass all degrees of homicide, including involuntary manslaughter,
currently recognized by various forms of the rule.,
Several states differentiate between degrees of unlawful-act homicide
solely on consideration of the nature of the underlying act involved.15 For
courts judicially recognize a different form of second degree felony murder. See, e.g., State
v. Alcorn, 7 Idaho 599, -, 64 P. 1014, 1019 (1901) (intent to commit felonious abortion
sufficient to support conviction of second degree felony murder); State v. Rowley, 216 Iowa
140, - 248 N.W. 340, 341 (1933) (same); Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 686 n.23, 349
A.2d 300, 330 n.23 (1975) (common-law felony murder rule raises homicide committed dur-
ing prepetration of felony to second degree murder), aff'd, 362 A.2d 629 (1976); Commonwealth
v. Ambers, 370 Mass. 835, 838, 352 N.E2d 922, 926 (1976) (homicide perpetrated during
commission of certain felonies equals second degree murder); State v. Powell, 630 S.W.2d
168, 170 (Mo. App. 1982) (dictum) (commission of certain unlawful voluntary acts may be
sufficient to supply intent requirement for second degree felony murder); Sheriff, Clark
County v. Willoughby, 97 Nev. 90, 92, 624 P.2d 498, 499 (1981) (homicide resulting from
attempted escape is murder, although not murder in the first degree); State v. Jenkins,
300 N.C. 578, -, 268 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1980) (dictum) (commission of certain inexcusable
wrongful acts may satisfy malice requirement for second degree murder); Bailey v. State,
479 S.W.2d 829, 831-33 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972) (intent to do unlawful act that probably
will result in loss of life satisfies malice requirement for second degree murder).
I See infra notes 30-33 (list of various statutory forms of felony murder rule). Several
states recognize a form of felony involuntary manslaughter which includes killings commit-
ted during the perpetration of a felony other than the felonies listed in the state's felony
murder statute. See IND. STAT. ANN. S 35-42-1-4 (Burns 1979 Repl. Vol.) (involuntary
manslaughter includes killings committed during perpetration of Class C or D felony that
inherently poses risk of serious bodily harm); LA. REV. STAT ANN. S 14.31 (West 1974) (in-
voluntary manslaughter includes killing during perpetration of felony not enumerated in
first or second degree murder statute); OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. S 2903.04 (Baldwin 1983) (in-
voluntary manslaughter includes killings during commission of felony not enumerated in
first degree felony murder statute). Most other states recognize a form of involuntary
manslaughter known as misdemeanor manslaughter which includes unintentional killings
committed during the perpetration of an unlawful act other than a felony. See, e.g., Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-29 (1972) (manslaughter includes killing committed during perpetration
of misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-403 (1975) (manslaughter conviction requires proof
of unintentional killing during commission of unlawful act); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 30-2-3 (1978)
(involuntary manslaughter conviction requires proof of killing during commission of unlawful
act not a felony). Nebraska courts have recognized a variety of unlawful acts that will sup-
port a manslaughter conviction. See Skinner v. Jensen, 178 Neb. 733, 734, 135 N.W.2d 134,
136 (1965) (proof of assault and battery will sustain manslaughter charge); Thiede v. State,
106 Neb. 48, 50, 182 N.W. 570, 572 (1921) (furnishing liquor with extremely high alcoholic
content may be unlawful act within meaning of manslaughter statute); Stehr v. State, 92
Neb. 755, 757, 139 N.W. 676, 677-78 (1913) (manslaughter charge based on proof of culpable
neglect of infant).
5 See CAL. PENAL CODE S 189 (West Supp. 1982) (distinction between first and second
degree felony murder based on whether killing occurred during commission of enumerated
or nonenumerated felony); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982) (distinction
between first and third degree felony murder depends on type of underlying felony in-
volved); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185, 609.19 (West Supp. 1982) (second and third degree
felony murder distinguished according to type of underlying felony involved); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21 % 701.7, 701.8 (West 1958 & Supp. 1982) (type of underlying felony involved
distinguishes first degree from second degree felony murder), S. DAK. CODIFIED LAWS §§
1983] 1607
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example, some states distinguish between first and second degree felony
murder based on whether the predicate felony was statutorily enumerated
rather than nonenumerated.3 6 Enumerated felonies are specific felonies
that a legislature lists in the state's homicide statute as sufficient to sup-
port a felony homicide conviction." Enumerated felonies typically include
inherently dangerous felonies, such as rape, arson, burglary, and
kidnapping. 8 Although first degree murder may require proof that the
defendant committed an enumerated felony,' a reduced degree of homicide
22-16-4, 22-16-9 (Supp. 1981) (same); VA. CODE S 18.2-33 (1982 Repl. Vol.) (first degree felony
murder distinguished from reduced degree of felony homicide according to nature of under-
lying felony involved); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030, 9A.32.050 (1977) (difference be-
tween first and second degree felony murder based on nature of underlying felony). Several
jurisdictions distinquish between degrees of felony murder and felony involuntary
manslaughter based only on differences in the type of underlying felony involved. See IND.
STAT. ANN. SS 3542-1-1, 35-42-14 (Burns 1979 Repl. Vol.) (difference between felony murder
and felony involuntary manslaughter based on type of underlying felony involved); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14:30.1, 14.31 (West Supp. 1982) (second degree felony murder and felony
involuntary manslaughter distinguished according to type of underlying felony involved);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. S§ 2903.01, 2903.04 (Baldwin 1983) (nature of underlying felony
distinguishes premeditated murder from involuntary manslaughter).
36 See supra note 35 (examples of statutes differentiating between degrees of felony
murder based on type of underlying felony involved).
1, See CAL. PENAL CODE S 189 (West Supp. 1982) (first degree felony murder includes
any killing committed during perpetration of arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or
any lewd or lascivious act towards child); FLA. STAT. ANN. S 782.04 (West 1976 & Supp.
1982) (felonies sufficient to satisfy first degree felony murder conviction are trafficking of
cannabis, arson, sexual battery, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, escape, aircraft piracy or
unlawful use of destructive device); S. DAK. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-164 (Supp. 1982) (first
degree felony murder includes killing during commission of arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
kidnapping or unlawful use of destructive device or explosive).
' See supra note 37 (examples of statutorily enumerated felonies that support first
degree felony murder convictions).
" See supra notes 34 & 35 (list of statutes requiring proof of commission of enumerated
felony to support conviction of higher offense). Some jurisdictions distinguish between capital
and noncapital murder based on whether the.killing occurred during the commission of
an enumerated or nonenumerated felony. See ARK. STAT. ANN. SS 41-1501, 41-1502 (1977
Repl. Vol.) (homicide occurring during commission of enumerated felony, rather than
nonenumerated felony, is capital offense). FLA. STAT. ANN. § 702.04 (West 1976 & Supp.
1982) (same); Miss. CODE ANN. S 97-3-19 (Supp. 1982) (same). Most jurisdictions, however,
require proof of a mental state, such as specific or premeditated intent to kill, as well as
proof of a homicide occurring during commission of an enumerated felony to convict a defen-
dant of capital murder. See ALA. CODE 5 13A-5-40 (1982 Repl. Vol.) (capital murder convic-
tion requires proof of both specific intent to kill and commission of an enumerated felony);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982) (same); IND. STAT. ANN. § 3542-1-1
(Burns 1979 Repl. Vol.) (same); NEv REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1981) (capital murder conviction
requires proof of a commission of "murder" that may be proved by evidence of felon's aban-
doned heart while perpetrating enumerated felony); N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2C:11-3 (West 1982)
(capital murder conviction requires proof of knowing or purposeful killing during commis-
sion of enumerated felony); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (same); VA. CODE
S 18.2-33 (1982 Repl. Vol.) (capital murder conviction requires proof of premeditated killing
during commission of enumerated felony). But see ARK. STAT. ANN. S 41-1501 (1977 Rep].
Vol.) (court may base capital murder conviction on proof of that defendant acted with ex-
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may require only proof of the commission of any other felony not statutor-
ily enumerated." Furthermore, a minority of states base a conviction of
a reduced degree of homicide upon proof of a killing resulting from the
commission of an unlawful act not specifically defined as a felony.4' Several
jurisdictions, however, statutorily or judicially limit the felony murder
rule by restricting the type of felony or unlawful act that may serve as
an adequate basis for conviction.42 For example, a Nevada statute requires
that to support a second degree murder conviction, the unlawful act must
be an act that naturally tends to destroy life.4" In Stallard v. State,44 the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that racing automobiles on the wrong side
of the road at excessive speeds was an unlawful act directly perilous to
human life.4 5 The Stallard court held that the unintentional killing com-
mitted during the unlawful act constituted murder in the second degree.46
States that differentiate between degrees of unlawful-act homicide
on the basis of the type of felony or unlawful act involved,47 generally
do not require additional proof of the defendant's mental state to support
a conviction of unlawful-act homicide.48 Several jurisdictions that recognize
treme indifference during commission of felony); Miss. CODE ANN. S 97-3-19 (Supp. 1982)
(proof of mental state not required for conviction of capital felony murder).
I3 See supra note 35 (list of statutes differentiating between degrees of felony homicide
based on whether killing occurred during commission of enumerated or nonenumerated
felony).
" See NEV. REV. STAT. S 200.070 (1981) (unintentional killing during commission of
unlawful act is manslaughter, although if unlawful act naturally tends to destroy life, kill-
ing is murder); see also infra text accompanying notes 44-46 (Tennessee Supreme Court
recognizes killing during certain unlawful acts as second degree murder).
41 See MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609-195 (West Supp. 1982) (third degree murder conviction
supported by evidence of unintentional killing during commission of eminently dangerous
act). In State v. Forsman, a Minnesota court convicted the defendant of third degree felony
murder. 260 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Minn. 1977). The defendant had unintentionally killed the
victim by administering injections of heroin. Id. at 165. Some courts within jurisdictions
that statutorily define felony murder as a killing during the commission of any felony re-
quire that the felony be inherently dangerous. See People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, - ,
450 P.2d 580, 590,75 Cal. Rptr. 188,197 (1969) (court determined whether felony, regardless
of the surrounding circumstances under which killing occurred, was inherently dangerous);
State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153,160-61 (Kan. 1980) (first degree felony murder conviction
requires proof that felony was inherently dangerous); Commonwealth v. Estromera, 419
N.E.2d 835, 843 (Mass. 1981) (second degree felony murder conviction required proof of in-
tent to commit act that creates plain and strong likelihood of death or grave harm).
' See NEv. REv. STAT. S 200.070 (1981) (killing during commission of unlawful act that
naturally tends to destroy life may constitute second degree felony murder).
" 209 Tenn. 13, 348 S.W.2d 489 (1961).
" See id. at 14, 348 S.W.2d at 490.
"Id.
'3See supra note 35 (list of statutes differentiating between degrees of felony homicide
based on type of underlying felony involved).
" See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1501, 41-1502 (1977 Repl. Vol.) (statutory distinction be-
tween capital and noncapital felony murder based on type of underlying act involved). The
Arkansas statute requires proof that the defendant acted with extreme indifference towards
life to support either a capital or noncapital felony murder conviction. Id.
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a reduced degree of unlawful-act homicide, however, also recognize a lower
mental state requirement for conviction of the reduced degree of homicide
when the defendant has not committed a felony or unlawful act.4 9 A lower
mental state refers to a form of malice aforethought that does not include
specific or premeditated intent to kill." Generally, a lower mental state
denotes a degree of recklessness.5' Some jurisdictions, however, recognize
a lower mental state similar to malice aforethought at early common law.2
Missouri, for instance, adheres to the early common-law definition of malice
aforethought as voluntary wrongdoing.-
State statutes and courts employ various terms, such as "extreme
indifference to human life,"' "abandoned and malignant heart,"'5 or
"depraved mind"'6 to designate a lower mental state. For example, in
Florida the prosecution may satisfy the mental state requirement for sec-
ond degree murder with proof that the defendant acted with a depraved
mind. 7 Furthermore, a Florida prosecutor may satisfy the requirements
for second degree murder with proof of a killing during the commission
of an enumerated felony." Therefore, a Florida court may convict a defen-
dant of murder either on proof of a killing during the commission of an
'9 See CAL. PENAL CODE S 187 (West Supp. 1982) (second degree murder is any unlawful
killing committed with malice aforethought). In People v. Matta, the California Court of Ap-
peals held that acts of "wanton disregard" towards human life provided evidence of malice
aforethought. 129 Cal. Rptr. 205, 210, 57 Cal. App.3d 472, 480 (1976). The Matta court held
that a felonious assault was an act evidencing wanton disregard. Id. at 210, 57 Cal. App.3d
at 481. Several jurisdictions require evidence of a "depraved mind" to satisfy the mental
state requirement for second degree murder when there is no charge of felony murder.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. S 782.04 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 5 701.8
(West Supp. 1982); S. DAK. CODIFIED LAWS, § 22-16-9 (Supp. 1982). Virginia requires proof
of malice aforethought to support a second degree murder conviction. See VA. CODE S 18.2-33
(1982 Repl. Vol.). But see MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.19 (West Supp. 1982) (second degree
murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill).
I See infra notes 53-56 (malice aforethought may not designate specific or premeditated
intent to kill).
51 See infra notes 53-56 (malice aforethought refers to various degrees of recklessness).
See State v. Powell, 630 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Mo. App. 1982) (malice aforethought means
intentional doing of wrongful act); Bailey v. State, 479 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1972) (malice aforethought denotes general condition of wicked and depraved spirit bent
on mischief).
3 See State v. Powell, supra note 52, at 170 (malice aforethought designates voluntary
wrongdoing).
-1 See N.J. STAT. ANN. S 2C:11-4 (West 1982) (manslaughter conviction requires proof
that defendant recklessly caused death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to human life).
" See NEv. REv. STAT. S 200.010 (1981) (abandoned and malignant heart evidences
malice aforethought); State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 336, 65 P.2d 736, 756-57 (1937) (in-
tent to kill or abandoned and malignant heart is essential element of second degree murder).
-1 See supra note 48 (evidence of depraved mind satisfies malice aforethought require-
ment of murder).
" See FLA. STAT. ANN. S 782.04 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982) (second degree murder re-
quires proof that defendant acted with a depraved mind).
11 See id.
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enumerated felony, or on proof that the defendant committed a killing
with a depraved heart. 9
Several jurisdictions distinguish between degrees of unlawful-act
homicide solely on the basis of the defendant's mental state accompany-
ing the commission of the unlawful act.' Generally, jurisdictions base a
conviction for second or third degree felony murder on proof that the defen-
dant committed a homicide, without specific or premediated intent, dur-
ing the perpetration of an enumerated felony." Proof of the additional
element of specific or premeditated intent to kill elevates the offense to
first degree or capital murder.62 Some jurisdictions, however, differentiate
between degrees of unlawful-act homicide on the basis of the degree of
recklessness accompanying the commission of the unlawful act."' For ex-
ample, in Collins v. State,64 the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that
first degree felony murder requires proof of a higher form of recklessness
than second degree felony murder. 5 In Collins, the defendant killed the
victim during the course of a robbery and was convicted of second degree
felony murder.6 The defendant appealed the conviction on the grounds
that the indictment insufficiently charged the defendant with either first
or second degree felony murder. 7 The Collins court stated that the in-
dictment sufficiently charged first degree felony murder which requires
proof of the defendant's reckless state of mind during the commission of
a nonenumerated felony. 8 The court further stated that the indictment,
9
!d. I
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 11-635, 11-636 (1979 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 1982). Delaware
statutes define first and second degree felony murder as an unlawful killing committed
during the perpetration of any felony. Id. First degree felony murder requires additional
proof of recklessness. Id. at § 11-636. Second degree felony murder requires additional proof
of criminal negligence. Id. at 11-635. Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Utah statutes
all define first degree and second degree felony murder as an unlawful killing during the
commission of an enumerated felony. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. SS 14:30, 14:31 (West 1974
& Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.185, 609.19 (West Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 630:1-a, 630:1-b (Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202, 76-5-203 (1978 Repl. Vol.
& Supp. 1981). Louisiana, Minnesota and Utah statutes require independent proof of intent
to kill for first degree felony murder. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. at S 14:30; MINN. STAT. ANN.
at § 609.185; UTAH CODE ANN. at S 76-5-202. New Hampshire requires separate proof that
a defendant knowingly caused the death of another to elevate second degree felony murder
to first degree felony murder. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 630:1-a (Supp. 1981).
' See supra note 60 (differences in felon's mental state distinguish first degree felony
murder from second degree felony murder).
n See supra note 60 (proof of higher mental state necessary to support conviction of
higher degree of felony murder).
I See infra note 65 (first degree felony murder requires proof of higher degree of
recklessness than second degree felony murder).
420 A.2d 170 (Del. 1980).
Id. at 173; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, S5 11-635, 11-636 (1979 Repl. Vol. 1982 Supp.)
(first degree felony murder requires proof of recklessness and second degree felony murder
requires proof of criminal negligence).
420 A.2d at 172.
67 Id.
" Id. at 173; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, S 11-636 (1979 Repl. Vol. & 1982 Supp.) (first
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afortiori, supported a second degree felony murder conviction requiring
proof of the lower mental state of criminal negligence. 9
Half of the jurisdictions that recognize mental state as the factor that
distinguishes between degrees of unlawful-act homicide, also recognize
a lower mental state requirement for conviction of the reduced degree
of homicide, absent evidence of the commission of a felony.70 For example,
in Utah, a defendant can be convicted of second degree felony murder
without proof of any particular mental state, if the defendant killed the
victim during the perpetration of an enumerated felony.7' A defendant
in Utah also can be convicted of second degree murder without proof of
the commission of a felony, if the defendant acted with depraved indif-
ference towards the victim by creating a grave risk of serious bodily
harm."
The remaining states that vary the degree of unlawful-act homicide
according to the defendant's mental state, however, require proof of a
higher mental state to convict a defendant of a reduced degree of
homicide.7 In State v. Stewart,4 for example, the defendant was convicted
degree felony murder includes recklessly causing death in furtherance of commission of
felony).
" 420 A.2d at 173; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 5 11-635 (1979 Repl. Vol.) (second degree
felony murder includes killings committed with criminal negligence during perpetration
of nonenumerated felony).
7* See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 630.1-b (Supp. 1981) (evidence that defendant acted reck-
lessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life satisfies malice
aforethought element of second degree murder). In New Hampshire, extreme indifference
to life indicates something more than a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk. See State v. Howland, 119 N.H. 413, __, 402 A.2d 188, 191 (1979). The Howland court
indicated that the extreme indifference element of second degree murder requires a higher
degree of recklessness than the recklessness element of manslaughter. Id. at __, 402 A.2d
at 191. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 630.2 (Supp. 1981) (manslaughter statute requires proof
of recklessness). Utah statutes permit courts to base second degree murder convictions
upon proof that the defendant acted with depraved indifference to life by creating a grave
risk of serious bodily harm. UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1981).
71 See UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1981) (second degree felony murder includes
killing during commission of robbery, rape, forcible sodomy, aggravated sexual assault, ar-
son, burglary, or kidnapping).
'2 See UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-5-203(1) (c) (Supp. 1981) (evidence of depraved indifference
towards life satisfies malice element of second degree murder). In State v. Day, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the jury should attach an ordinary meaning to the words "depraved
indifference." 572 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1977). The Day court stated that failure to define
the words "depraved indifference" did not constitute error. Id. The jury in Day convicted
the defendant of second degree murder relying upon evidence that the defendant had struck
the deceased on the head with a wooden stick after an argument regarding an automobile
collision. Id. at 704-5.
11 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 14:30.1 (West Supp. 1982) (if second degree murder in-
dictment does not charge felony murder, then prosecution must prove that defendant
specifically intended to kill or cause bodily harm); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 609.19 (West Supp.
1982) (second degree nonfelony murder requires proof that defendant, without premedita-
tion, specifically intended to kill).
" 400 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981).
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of second degree felony murder on proof that the defendant killed the
victim while committing armed robbery. 5 The Louisiana statute for
nonfelony second degree murder, however, requires proof of specific in-
tent to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm before courts can convict a
defendant of second degree murder.
716
A minority of state statutes apply alternative forms of the felony
murder rule to one particular degree of unlawful-act homicide .7 For ex-
ample, a Delaware statute varies the mental state requirement for first
degree felony murder according to the nature of the underlying felony. 7
8
Delaware's first degree murder statute requires proof of a higher mental
state, such as recklessness, when the killing occurred during the perpetra-
tion of an enumerated, rather than a nonenumerated felony.79 If the kill-
ing occurred during the commission of an enumerated felony, however,
the Delaware statute only requires proof of criminal negligence to sup-
port a first degree felony murder conviction.0 Three other jurisdictions
have completely abolished the felony murder rule, either through statutory
enactments or judicial abrogation."
The majority of jurisdictions that statutorily recognize more than one
degree of unlawful-act homicide employ one of two general methods for
distinguishing between degrees of unlawful-act homicide.2 Ten jurisdic-
tions differentiate between degrees of unlawful-act homicide based on the
' Id. at 635.
78 See State v. Huizar, 414 So. 2d 741, 746 (La. 1982) (gravaman of second degree murder
statute is specific intent to kill); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 14:30.1(1) (West Supp. 1982) (se-
cond degree murder requires proof of intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm).
" See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 11-636 (1979 RepI. Vol. & Supp. 1982) (recognition of
two different statutory forms of first degree felony murder); D.C. CODE ANN. 5 22-2401 (1981)
(statute provides two means for proving first degree felony murder).
11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, S 11-636 (1979 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 1982). The Delaware first
degree felony murder statute provides the prosecution with two different means of prov-
ing first degree felony murder. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 79 & 80 (mental state
element of first degree felony murder in Delaware varies according to whether killing oc-
curred during perpetration of enumerated or nonenumerated felony). The District of Col-
umbia recognizes two forms of first degree felony murder. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2401
(1981). In the District of Columbia, if the underlying felony was nonenumerated, proof that
defendant, purposely, or deliberately and premeditately killed, sustains a first degree felony
murder conviction. Id. If the killing occurred during the perpetration of an enumerated
felony, however, courts do not require additional proof of "purpose." Id.
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 11-636(a) (2) (1979 Repl. Vol.).
Id. at § 11-636(a) (6) (Supp. 1982).
81 See HAwAII REV. STAT. S 707-701 (1976 Repl. Vol.) (abolishing felony murder rule);
KY. REV. STAT. § 507-020 (1975 Repl. Vol.) (same). See also People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 703,
728, 299 N.W.2d 304, 314 (1980) (judicially abrogating felony murder rule).
I See supra notes 33 & 34 (examples of jurisdictions recognizing more than one degree
of unlawful-act homicide). The comparison of the states' methods for distinguishing degrees
of unlawful-act homicide does not include consideration of misdemeanor manslaughter as
a form of unlawful-act homicide. See supra note 34 (discussion of distinction between felony
and misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter).
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type of unlawful-act involved.' Generally, a reduced degree of unlawful-
act homicide requires proof of a killing committed during the perpetra-
tion of a nonenumerated, rather than an enumerated felony.' The major-
ity of these ten jurisdictions recognize a lower mental state requirement
for the reduced offense when no independent felony is involved.15 Fur-
thermore, the majority of these jurisdictions judicially limit the rule by
restricting the type of unlawful act that may support a conviction of the
reduced degree of unlawful-act homicide.' Six of the ten jurisdictions,
however, continue to apply the rule to higher offenses that otherwise re-
quire proof of specific or premediated intent to kill
The remaining jurisdictions that statutorily recognize more than one
degree of unlawful-act homicide differentiate between degrees of homicide
on the basis of the felon's mental state during the commission of the
felony.8 The majority of these jurisdictions require independent proof of
a mental state such as recklessness or knowledge to support a conviction
of the higher degree of unlawful-act homicide. Over half of these remain-
ing jurisdictions also require either proof of a separate mental state to
support a reduced degree of unlawful-act homicide" or recognize a lower
mental state requirement for the reduced offense. 1 A minority of these
jurisdictions, however, allow evidence that the defendant committed an
enumerated felony to support a conviction of a reduced degree of homicide
that otherwise requires proof of specific intent to kill.2
I See supra note 35 (degree of felony homicide varies according to nature of underly-
ing felony).
SId.
See supra note 49 (recognition of lower mental state requirements for certain degrees
of homicide).
' See supra text accompanying notes 4245 (discussion of judicial limitations imposed
on type of felony that may support felony homicide conviction).
' See CAL. PENAL CODE 5 189 (West Supp. 1982) (first degree murder conviction re-
quires proof of premeditation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West 1976 & Supp. 1982) (same);
MINN. STAT. ANN. S 609.185 (West Supp. 1982) (if indictment does not charge felony murder
then prosecution must prove intent and premeditation for first degree murder conviction);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 S 701.7 (West Supp. 1982) (first degree murder conviction requires
proof of deliberate, intentional killing); S. DAK. CODIFIED LAWS S 22-16-4 (Supp. 1981)
(premeditation is requisite element of first degree murder); VA. CODE S 18.2-32 (1982 Repl.
Vol.) (same). But see WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. S 9A-32-30 (1977), (proof of premeditation or
extreme indifference towards human life may support first degree murder conviction).
" See supra note 60 (mental state is factor that distinguishes between degrees of felony
homicide).
" See supra note 60 (proof of specific or premeditated intent to kill elevates degree
of felony homicide).
I See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 5 11-635 (1979 Repl. Vol.) (second degree felony murder
conviction requires proof of criminal negligence and killing committed during perpetration
of nonenumerated felony).
91 See supra text accompanying notes 60-69 (reduced degrees of homicide require proof
of lower mental state).
' See supra text accompanying notes 73-76 (reduced degree of nonfelony homicide re-
quires proof of specific or premeditated intent to kill).
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In jurisdictions that retain statutes applying the rule to degrees of
murder that otherwise require proof of specific or premediated intent to
kill, defendants may nevertheless argue against the court's strict applica-
tion of the rule. 3 First, defendants can urge the court to construe the
felony murder statute as requiring separate proof of the elements of
murder, including the requisite mental state, before applying the felony
murder rule. 4 For example, in People v. Aaron,95 the Michigan Supreme
Court interpreted Michigan's first degree felony murder statute as re-
quiring independent proof of a "murder."" The Michigan court stated that
the additional proof of an independent felony only operates to elevate the
offense of murder to first degree murder.7 The Aaron court reasoned that
since the relevant statute defined first degree felony murder as any
"murder," rather than any "killing," committed during the perpetration
of an enumerated felony, the state must initially prove the elements of
murder without relying on proof of the commission of an independent
felony. 8
The argument that the prosecution must separately prove the elements
of murder before applying the felony murder rule is difficult to assert,
however, in jurisdictions that recognize a reduced degree of unlawful-act
homicide." At the time of the Aaron court's decision, Michigan recognized
only first degree felony murder.' Construing statutes that recognize
reduced degrees of unlawful-act homicide as requiring independent proof
of the elements of nonfelony murder, renders the statutory requirements
of evidence of the commission of a separate felony mere surplusage.
Courts in jurisdictions that statutorily recognize reduced degrees of
I See supra note 87 (list of statutes that require proof of specific or premeditated
intent to kill for nonfelony murder).
" See Michigan v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 688, 299 N.W.2d 304, 326 (1980) (malice re-
quirement of murder not satisfied by evidence of commission of enumerated or
nonenumerated felony); State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Iowa 1979) (proof of intent
to commit underlying felony does not relieve prosecution of burden of proving malice re-
quirement of murder).
11 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980).
Id. at 688, 299 N.W.2d at 326. In People v. Aaron, the Michigan Supreme Court stated
that proof of the commission of a felony may provide evidence of the malice element of
murder. Id. The Aaron court held that the jury, however, must ultimately decide whether
malice did exist. Id.
" Id. at 689, 299 N.W.2d at 327. The Aaron court stated that the prosecution may
prove first degree murder, without evidence of premeditation, when a homicide is commit-
ted with malice during the perpetration of an enumerated felony. Id.
" Id. at 321-23. The Aaron court held that the term "murder" in Michigan's first degree
felony murder statute required the prosecution to initially prove murder before applying
the statute to elevate the degree. Id. at 323.
' See supra notes 94 & 97 (term "murder" in felony murder statutes requires indepen-
dent proof of malice requirement of muder); supra notes 33 & 34 (list of states recognizing
reduced degrees of unlawful-act homicide).
" See 409 Mich. at 674, 299 N.W.2d at 306 (defendant convicted under Michigan's first
degree felony murder statute).
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unlawful-act homicide may adopt one of two alternative constructions of
the felony murder rule.01 Some courts may assert that the rule substitutes
the felon's mental state accompanying the commission of an unlawful-act
for the mental state element of murder. 2 When the mental state require-
ment of murder is specific or premeditated intent, defendants may argue
that proof of an independent felony or unlawful act does not provide
evidence of the requisite mental state and therefore allows the prosecu-
tion to circumvent the constitutional requirement of proving every ele-
ment of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.10 3 In In re Winship, °' the
United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment requires that the prosecution bear the burden of prov-
ing every element of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.'
The prosecution, however, may assert the counter-argument that the
felony murder rule establishes a separate type of malice aforethought other
than specific or premediated intent to kill.0 6 For example, in jurisdictions
that differentiate between degrees of unlawful-act homicide solely on the
basis of whether the underlying act was an enumerated or a nonenumer-
ated felony,10 7 the prosecution may argue that the commission of an
'01 See infra text accompanying notes 94, 102 & 108 (discussion of alternative construc-
tions of current felony murder rule).
102 See, e.g., De Loach v. State, 388 So.2d 31, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (intent to
commit felony supplants malice aforethought requirement of murder); State v. Underwood,
228 Kan. 294, -, 615 P.2d 153, 160 (1980) (doctrine of transferred intent permits court
to substitute intent to commit inherently dangerous felony for malice aforethought ele-
ment of first degree murder); Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 263-64, 373 A.2d 262, 266-67
(1977) (proof of every element of underlying felony establishes element of malice necessary
for murder); State v. Battick, 133 Vt. 558, 559, 349 A.2d 221, 223 (1975) (felony murder rule
operates as conclusive presumption automatically imputing elements of first degree murder).
103 See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 518-24 (1979). The Sandstrom Court held
that a jury instruction stating that the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts was unconstitutional. Id. at 518-21. The Court stated
that the fact that the defendant had killed another human being did not permit the jury
to conclusively presume that the defendant had "purposely or knowingly" caused the death
of another. Id. at 517. The Court reasoned that a jury instruction permitting a conclusive
presumption regarding the malice requirement of murder violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 518-24. The Sandstrom Court explained that the due
process clause requires the prosecution to prove every element of murder beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 521-23. A conclusive presumption of malice therefore permits prosecutors to
avoid the due process burden of proof requirement. Id. at 523; see In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970) (due process clause of fourteenth amendment requires prosecution to prove
every element of crime beyond a reasonable doubt).
10, 397 U.S. 358 (1980).
105 Id. at 363-64 (beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof protects individuals from
loss of liberty due to erroneous convictions based on insufficient evidence).
"0 See Whitman v. People, 161 Colo. 110, -, 420 P.2d 416, 418 (1966) (turpitude of
felonious act supplies element of malice for first degree murder although killing was casual
and unintentional).
10, See supra note 35 (list of statutes differentiating between degrees of unlawful-act
homicide on basis of nature of underlying felony).
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enumerated felony evidences a degree of recklessness much more extreme
than the recklessness inherent in the commission of a nonenumerated
felony or the degree of recklessness sufficient for nonfelony murder.
The argument that the rule creates a separate type of malice
aforethought, however, is contrary to the original conceptualization of the
rule at common law."8 When English courts originally applied the rule,
the malice aforethought element of murder designated a general
malevolence or voluntary wrongdoing, rather than a specific or
premeditated intent to kill. 9 Therefore, the felon's mental state accom-
panying the commission of certain felonies provided evidence of the malice
aforethought requirement of general malevolence."' When malice
aforethought in current statutes designates a degree of recklessness, the
felon's mental state during the commission of certain dangerous felonies
provides evidence of the requisite malice aforethought element."' If cur-
rent statutes, however, extend the rule to offenses that otherwise require
proof of specific or premeditated intent, the felon's mental state while
committing the felony can no longer supply the malice aforethought ele-
ment of the offense.
Courts ultimately may assert that the felony murder rule abolishes
the mental state requirement of murder."' Statutes that permit courts
I" See infra text accompanying notes 109-112 (discussion of inconsistencies between
current felony murder statutes and malice aforethought principles that underlay rule at
common law).
"' See supra note 15 (common-law definition of malice aforethought as general
malevolence). Some courts, however, disagreed as to the exact meaning of malice aforethought
during the developmental stages of the felony murder rule. See Anachronism, supra note
12, at 430 n.22 (conflicting definitions of malice aforethought in seventeenth century). One
argument emphasizes that the Statute of Stabbing, passed in 1604, provided evidence that
malice aforethought designated premeditation. See Statute of Stabbing, 2 Jac. 1, c. 8 (1604);
MORELAND, supra note 5, at 11 & n.17. The Statute of Stabbing eliminated the benefit of
the clergy from homicides committed by a stabbing resulting from any provocation less
than a drawn weapon. See 2 Jac. 1, c. 8 (1604). Sudden killings resulting from sufficient
provocation, however, did not constitute murder. Id. If certain sudden killings were not
murder, then the malice aforethought element of murder must have referred to premedita-
tion. See STEPHEN, supra note 13, at 47-48. Courts in the late seventeenth century, however,
stated that even sudden, cruel acts may involve malice aforethought if the defendant acted
voluntarily. See Halloway's Case, 79 Eng. Rep. 715, 716 (1625) (sudden killing of trespasser
involved malice aforethought if victim did not resist); Grey's Case, 84 Eng. Rep. 1084, 1085
(1866) (blacksmith, who upon sudden provocation fatally wounded disobedient servant, con-,
victed of murder). The counter-argument to ascribing premeditation to malice aforethought
was that provoked, sudden homicides were not indicative of a general malevolence. See
FOSTER, CRIMINAL CASES & CROwN LAW 255 (1762) (provoked homicide does not result from
diabolical malignity, but from human fraility, and is therefore less serious than murder).
' Id.
,' See supra text accompanying notes 53-56 (malice aforethought designates degree
of recklessness).
1' See supra notes 85 & 92 (when indictment does not charge defendant with unlawful-
act homicide, prosecution must prove specific or premeditated intent to kill).
113 See Burke v. State, 234 Ga. 512, 514, 216 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1975) (difference between
nonfelony and felony murder is absence of malice in felony murder).
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to base a homicide conviction on proof that the defendant committed a
felony or unlawful act without requiring any evidence of a mental state
operate contrary to the current emphasis on mental culpability as the ap-
propriate basis of criminal liability."' Courts have suggested, however,
that other reasons exist for retaining a rule that operates contrary to
current principles of criminal liability.15 Courts assert that the felony
murder rule's possible deterrent effect on felons provides an important
reason for retaining the rule."6 Courts reason that holding felons strictly
responsible for felony homicides may deter felons from killing negligently
or accidentally. 7 Other courts, although, assert the counterargument that
increased punishment for inadvertent crimes has no possible deterrent
effect and that legislatures, therefore, should eliminate the rule. " 8
Although several states apply various forms of the felony murder rule
to reduced degrees of unlawful-act homicide, the majority of jurisdictions
retain first degree felony murder statutes." In the absence of legislative
action, however, courts have adopted various means for restricting the
application of the rule.20 Courts in several states impose various re-
quirements regarding the inherent danger of the underlying felony.' Other
courts have construed felony murder statutes to require independent proof
of all the elements of murder before applying the rule." Despite arguments
regarding the inapplicability of the felony murder rule to higher degrees
of murder,"3 some courts nevertheless will continue to strictly apply the
rule without adopting any limitations to protect defendants from the
resulting harsh penalties.
MICHELLE L. GILBERT
114 See MORELAND, supra note 13, at 53-54 (presentation of argument that felony murder
rule only should be applied to reduced degree of homicide requiring lower mental state
culpability); see also 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 59 (1881) (felony murder rule should be
applied only to crimes evincing high degree of risk to human life).
"I See infra text accompanying notes 103-04 (discussion of possible rationale for retain-
ing felony murder rule).
Il See People v. Washington 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781, 44 Cal Rptr. 442, 445, 402 P.2d 130,
133 (1965) (purpose of felony murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or ac-
cidentally); Campbell v. State of Maryland, 293 Md. 938, 992, 444 A.2d 1034, 1042 (1982)
(deterrent effect of rule not served by extending punishment under rule for killings com-
mitted by felon's victim).
1" See supra note 116 (discussion of deterrent effect of felony murder rule).
1,8 See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Legg, 491 Pa. 78, -, 417 A.2d 1152, 1154
(1980) (deterrent effect of felony murder rule questioned).
119 See supra notes 31-33 (list of statutes defining first degree felony murder).
, See supra text accompanying notes 8, 42, 94-97 (discussion of judicially imposed limita-
tions on felony murder rule).
12, See supra note 42 (underlying felony must be inherently dangerous to support felony
murder conviction).
11 See supra notes 94-97 (felony murder statute only operates to elevate degree of of-
fense, not to supply malice requirement of murder).
1, See supra text accompanying notes 103-105, 114 (felony murder rule operates con-
trary to current principles of malice aforethought and criminal liability).
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